The disciplined winds blow in from the West: The forgotten epistemic inheritance of historical thinking

Bryan Smith
James Cook University, Australia

ABSTRACT: In various jurisdictions around the world, the methods of historical thinking have come to frame and organise how history education is taught. These methods, informed by robust and ample research, offer students a comprehensive entry into historical knowledge construction. Moreover, these methods help shift history away from a transmission centric approach towards one that asks students to engage the past and employ disciplinary thinking skills to construct and engage the past. While such an approach can be helpful in driving new approaches to the past, it’s theorisation and scholarship is largely predicated on a normalised and unquestioned Western inheritance, the result of which is the expression of pedagogical method that reinscribes Western ways of knowing. In this paper, I argue that, as a result, historical thinking is often (re)presented without due consideration of both (a) how historical thinking is presented and assumed as universally transferable and; (b) done so without attention paid to the subjectivities that give rise to its conceptual base. Such practices, quintessentially Western in nature, pose challenges in settler contexts where teachers and students are being asked to begin the difficult work of unpacking and questioning Western and colonial knowledges and ways of knowing. While this is not to suggest that we dispense with historical thinking, the normalised presence of an (implied) universally applicable method raises necessary questions about the work yet to be done in complicating not just what students learn but how they do so.

KEYWORDS: History education, Western practise, disciplinary methods, critical history, decolonising pedagogy.

Introduction

The scholarly disciplines represent the formidable achievements of talented human beings, toiling over the centuries, to approach and explain issues of enduring importance. Shorn of disciplinary knowledge, human beings are quickly reduced to the level of ignorant children, indeed, to the ranks of barbarians. (Gardner & Boix-Mansilla, 1994, p. 199)

Most of the 'traditional' disciplines are grounded in cultural world views which are either antagonistic to other belief systems or have no methodology for dealing with other knowledge systems. (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p. 65)

At first glance, the assertion put forth by Howard Gardner and Veronica Boix-Mansilla may appear rather hyperbolic. Speaking to a history of “talented human beings” (1994, p. 199), Gardner and Boix-Mansilla offer a rather bold claim that disciplinary logic is capable of rescuing peoples from barbarism. Out of such a claim, one might be led to believe that disciplines are a form of intellectual inoculation against a risky slip back to times of ignorance. Yet, as Linda Tuhiwai Smith reminds us, these disciplinary practices are
The disciplined winds blow in from the West

antagonistic or incapable of dealing with certain forms of knowledge. This is largely because they are the “formidable achievement” of certain people and contexts, that is, (those in/of) the West. Gardner and Boix-Mansilla’s argument here exemplifies such naivety to context and, I would argue, deference to disciplinary thinking as universally applicable and naive to the cultural worldviews from which they arise is common in education. In history, this can be seen in the work of historical thinking, a pedagogical method over how to think historically that engages with the, “richer and deeper disciplinary understanding that comes from knowing how history is made” (Sandwell & von Heyking, 2014, p. 1). Leveraging the taken-for-grantedness of Western thinking – the articulation of knowledge absent the subject and a position from which knowledge is presented as a “Truthful universal knowledge” (Grosfoguel, 2007, p. 213) that is unaware of “the effects, and limitations, of its geographical location” (Alcoff, 2017, p. 397) – I suggest that historical thinking scholarship, as an unabashedly Western way of thinking for history pedagogy, inherits unresolved epistemic commitments to knowledge that risk reproducing the normative place of Western ways of constructing the past.

In this paper, I argue first that disciplines and their attendant practices cement Western thinking and in so doing, frame the terrain of legitimacy and codify the West in how we teach and learn. Further, I suggest that historical thinking, as a product of and support for Western disciplinary practice, inherits its epistemic presumptions and re-asserts it through the translation of disciplined thinking into pedagogical theory. This, I suggest, becomes clear when we look to historical thinking scholarship’s adoption of Western disciplined thinking and the consequences of this, namely, presumptions of universal methodological applicability and the evacuation of the subject (that is, theorists) from critical consideration.

Disciplined knowledge

Beginning with the Enlightenment, Western scholars sought to coalesce around particular epistemic framings for knowledge generation and dissemination (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999). With the ascendancy of beliefs in the pursuit and possibility of rationality, reason and the rendering of all symbolic and material existence as definitively intelligible, the West heralded into consideration a particular epistemic framing. Here, precision, careful method and deference to universal notions of rational ideals served to anchor thinking in and through defensible modes of thinking and knowing. Anxieties about the need to discover universal truths led to the creation of a curated set of methods and ontologies, each speaking to (explaining) different aspects of humanity and the natural world. The domains in which these ideas flourished — disciplines — sought to circumscribe the terrain of knowledge and manage intrusions of folklore and mythology that threatened the noble pursuit of reasoned and rigorous knowledge-making, that is to say, Truth.

What, though, are disciplines? First, disciplines are often presented as circumscriptive with respect to what counts as legitimate knowledge claims. As Freebody argues, a discipline, refer[s] to a tradition of inquiry that provides a coherent suite of answers (what the answers are, how definite they are, and how shared they are) to questions such as: What counts as evidence? What counts as reliability? What counts as fact and opinion, and what is the relative significance of each in proof of truth and value? What do the ‘right answers’ look like and what are the ‘right’ ways of finding them? Is the main goal documentation, explanation or interpretation? What does the appropriate relationship between expert/teacher and novice/student look like? (2006, p. 11)

Similar sentiments about inquiry are echoed by Krishnan (2009) who suggests that one of the principle characteristics of disciplines is the articulation and use of specific methods to support “the organisation of learning and the systematic production of new knowledge” (p. 9). These methods contribute to the essential “regulatory practices” (Turner, 2006) that
The disciplined winds blow in from the West

comprise the guiding force of disciplines; these practices (methods) police the creation of "legitimate knowledge" as meaningful deviation risks undermining the coherence of the discipline. Each discipline engages in this uniquely, deploying their own methodological framing to guard access to legitimate knowledge. Take Shulman (1981, p. 6) who argues that what distinguishes disciplines from one another is the manner in which they formulate their questions, how they define the content of their domains and organize that content conceptually, and the principles of discovery and verification that constitute the ground rules for creating and testing knowledge in their fields.

What distinguishes disciplines, then, is not their divergence with respect to the place of methods or "principles of discovery" but how they define what these look like, an argument echoed by Post (2009).

Second, disciplines require particular ways of communicating knowledge. Speaking to this notion, Tusting and Barton suggest that disciplines include, "recognised practices for data or source collection and analysis, and also with specific forms of writing — established genres and discourses for conveying the knowledge created by the discipline, which are structured in recognisable ways" (2016, pp. 16-17). To be a member of the disciplinary community, one must speak and communicate through the expected forms. A discipline, drawing on and normalising particular Discursive practices — ways of being and expression (Gee, 2012) — cements practices and theories which in turn provide a specific and expected vocabulary, identification, and mode of presentation.

Finally, disciplines have a lineage, anchored in the work of heroes. Much like historical narratives which often root themselves in the stories of individual and collective experience, disciplines often seek to ground themselves in the accomplishments of key figures. In history, Leopold von Ranke is often advanced as the discipline’s key figure, the one who articulated the discipline’s key methodological principles. Von Ranke, “Father of the historical profession” (Fallace & Neem, 2005, p. 330), is credited with furnishing future historians with the methodological and epistemic tools to intelligibly render a narrative of the past. Prioritising a sense of fidelity with the evidence, von Ranke sought to delineate a clear vision for what history was and could be. While historiographical work has been theorized beyond Ranke’s rather empirically minded and ‘objective’ concerns, Ranke’s imprint on the discipline is quite marked (Barber, 1982; Boldt, 2014).

While definitions of disciplines are inherently multifaceted — Sugimoto and Weingart (2015) suggests the landscape of definitions is akin to a kaleidoscope — the three characteristics above often serve as key guiding features of contemporary disciplines. What has yet to be noted, however, is how these three principles are not neutral or derived from universal principles. Indeed, disciplines can become ‘guilty’ intellectual practice by virtue of their use divorced from consideration of their historical and epistemic origins.

The guilt of disciplines

Disciplines, Becher (1989) reminds us, are spaces of “recognizable identities and particular cultural attributes” (p. 22), their cultural features preserving, instantiating and reifying, “their traditions, customs and practices, transmitted knowledge, beliefs, morals and rules of conduct, as well as their linguistic and symbolic forms of communication and the meanings they share” (p. 24). Crucial here is the observation that disciplinary spaces are built upon a series of historical practices, folk heroes, and a “machinery of socialisation” (p. 25) that serves to secure particular elements of the discipline. As productions of Western conceptions of knowledge as bounded entities, these practices, modes of conduct and socialisation requirements are inescapably Western in flavour.
As noted in the epigraph, disciplines as a Western intellectual construct cannot be understood as something innocent. As a product of Western tradition, the kinds of vocabularies, theories and approaches to knowledge production that disciplines demand and command are indelibly marked by certain forms of thinking. To think in a disciplinary fashion — to use its epistemic toolset — is to think through the intellectual lens of the West, to defer to what Hirst (1974) might call its form of knowledge. This is particularly problematic in spaces where we work to address the vast series of exclusions that Western logics have enacted, justified and thrived on, particularly those in colonised spaces where exclusion was, and remains, the modus operandi of everyday life. The challenge here is perhaps not all that surprising; as part of what Walter Mignolo (2011) calls the “Western Code,” the belief that Western epistemology can claim a monopoly over and universalise logics, disciplines are complicit framing devices that perpetuate Western languages, questioning and intellectual heroes, the consequence of which is the normalisation of methodological and epistemic exclusion. Disciplined history specifically engages in an “imperialism of categories” whereby the disciplinary approach exercises a hegemony that all but disavows other forms of knowing (Nandy, 1995). In what follows, I suggest that historical thinking, as a disciplined practice, risks reinforcing Western disciplined practice as a taken for granted mode of entering into knowledge production and its attendant exclusions. Specifically, I suggest that historical thinking’s disciplinary language and intellectual culture is fundamentally Western in nature, exemplified in two quintessentially Western practices: an implicit claim to universal knowledge/method and an evacuation of the subject from consideration.

**Historical thinking and its Western essence**

Macrohistorians today go about their scholarly work using the historical methods developed largely in the West since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and refined by professional practice in the last century or so. One does not need to be a devotee of Edward Said and postcolonial thinking to wonder whether this involves a measure of intellectual imperialism [...] it seems ironic to operate functionally as if the historical methods and practices developed and used by the academy in the West exhaust what we can say meaningfully about the past (Yerxa, 2009, p. 7).

As an area of research and scholarship arising out of the UK and moving across the West (Pollock, 2014), historical thinking is shaped by Western practice by virtue of its adherence to disciplinarity. Further, I warrant that historical thinking mobilises the aforementioned “Western code” (Mignolo, 2011) to crystallise Western thought as the only mode of knowing that can support ‘real’ historical work. Take, for instance, Michael Marker’s claim for re-imagined historical and disciplinary work. For Marker, “academic disciplines and approaches to scholarship are culturally biased and hegemonic in confrontation with Indigenous place-based knowledge” (2004, p. 103). Applying this line of thinking to history education, Marker (2011) calls for a better approach to the past that attends to the past beyond the comforts of the Western frame. In response to this, claims have been made that an effort to Indigenise historical consciousness does not respect nor meet the needs of contemporary contexts. For instance, Seixas (2012) suggests that Marker’s call for non-Western modes of knowing the past do not warrant serious consideration because, “once indigenous ways of knowing are actually part of the textbook’s way of knowing, then who will be able to object to histories based on Islamic cosmology, Biblical fundamentalism and Haitian voodoo?” (p. 136). Elsewhere, in a consideration of colonial historical practices and Western hegemony, Seixas suggests that “within the context of public educational systems, however, it [recognition of differential approaches to historical work] will fail to satisfy the demands of fundamentalist religious movements, aboriginal activists and other antimodern tendencies [emphasis added]” (Seixas, 2017a, p. 68). Further, the inclusion of “aboriginal historical consciousness” risks,
they suggest, relativizing standards of truth and access to the past, framing this as an affront to the truth-telling capacity and right of more modernist/disciplinary thinking. This kind of thinking is an extension of what Brownlie (2009) identifies as the easy accommodation of some lines of thought (for example, vignettes in a textbook) and the dismissal of modes of encountering and understanding the past that do not fit into, “the existing forms, epistemologies, methodologies, and interpretive frameworks” (p. 36) of academic approaches to history.

The kinds of uncritical deference to Western logic exemplified above in defence of historical thinking is a particularly acute manifestation of disciplinary thinking obscuring, ironically, the effects of history on knowledge of the present. However, it is not an isolated concern and rather, the defence of and deference to Western logic is symptomatic of the field’s unresolved and evasive position with respect to fundamental issues: the universalisation of Western disciplinary practice and the evacuation of the subject.

The universal and vanishing Western backdrop

The first concerning deference to Western logic appears in the unquestioned presentation of historical thinking as universally applicable across pedagogical contexts (something manifest in concrete ways in the emphatic uptake of historical thinking in places like Australia and Canada in similar ways). As a product of Western epistemology that believes in a capacity to construct knowledge from a “god eyed view” (Grosfoguel, 2007), historical thinking scholarship does little to acknowledge and theorise the consequences of its Western inheritance, a natural consequence of being birthed out of a tradition averse to an “epistemic self-awareness.” This is evident in cursory acknowledgments of the West as the origin of historical thinking only with the West’s impress ignored in favour of “god eyed” theorisation of historical practice.

As noted, in the presentation of a method rooted in the Western epistemic tradition, historical thinking is acknowledged as a product of the West but once done, the West melts away, no longer needed as an identifier (see Lévesque, 2008; Seixas, 2017b). Elsewhere, the presence of “historical thinking” is given an origin in the American context only to persist later as a contextually independent idea that can apply to the practice of history more broadly (Lévesque, 2011). Similar presentational techniques occur in conversations of assessment, with Ercikan and Seixas (2015) beginning from the premise that the European/North American distinction in practice and theory is a given. This results in the promulgation of a powerful fiction that history and our (disciplined) entry is to be understood as only worth knowable through the Western episteme; the West is a given and unproblematic origin point, not worth critical attention as an influential intellectual frame. As Stuart Hall (1992) reminds us, the West has long been both an “organizing factor” and “the organizing concept or term in a whole way of thinking and speaking” (p. 187) and in presentations of historical thinking, the West has been granted the role as organizer of historical methods for future pedagogical work with little concern.

In a different sense, the West is elided as a conceptual and historical influence, a practice common in thinking that conflates the West with everything. For instance, Drake and Brown (2003) simply present historical thinking as a finalised accomplishment, epistemological considerations abandoned in favour of the methodological capacity. Perhaps more powerful however is the presumption of Western context, made possible through inference. For instance, Seixas and Morton (2013) suggest that, “this framework allows for progression [original emphasis]: students can use the concepts to move from depending on easily available, commonsense notions of the past to using the culture’s [emphasis added]
most powerful intellectual tools for understanding history” (p. 3). While the notion of culture is without qualification, the suggestion that these concepts are those that “academic historians” use and that the “culture’s tools” are from the discipline of history weds “our culture” with the context from which the disciplinary tools arise and continue development, that is, the West. Elsewhere, Roberts (2013) similarly elides the Western framing of the past, albeit in a different sense. For Roberts, disciplinary thinking is critical in preserving “our [Australian] democracy” and “our [Australian] society.” Who is the “our”? Left ambiguous, it’s impossible to pin down directly but as Harrison (2013) argues, the skills as outlined in the Australian Curriculum centre a “western epistemology that relies on the production of knowledge as disembodied” (p. 218). Further, they suggest that this, “will continue to suit those students who divide up their world in these ways” through “objective” skills such as “significance” and “cause and effect” (p. 221). The preservation of “our” democracy and society, then, is coupled with Western concepts which have the potential of better serving some. Said differently, those who find value in Western thinking are best suited to imagine and trace what is required to preserve “our” society. In each example, the West haunts the logics of argumentation, with disciplinary logic coming to be useful for all (or so it is presented).

**The evacuated subject**

Once upon a time scholars assumed that the knowing subject in the disciplines is transparent, disincorporated from the known and untouched by the geo-political configuration of the world in which people are racially ranked and regions are racially configured (Mignolo, 2009, p. 2).

I come to this work as a racialised white, middle class, cis-gendered male, whose upbringing in Canada and migration to Australia have been, and remain, centred and privileged by virtue of a white possessive logic that writes into the symbolic and material spaces of here a pervasive whiteness that I can be written into as someone who belongs (Moreton-Robinson, 2003, 2015). Given that our epistemic dispositions are determined, largely, by our “loci of enunciation” (Mignolo, 1999), I would be remiss not to attend to the role of my enunciantory locus for this indelibly marks the kinds of thinking that I do and, to a great extent, the kinds of thinking that I have long been trained to engage in (including disciplined thinking). As a subject whose corporeality is read comfortably into dominant discourses and patternings of supremacy, I was educated in a way and continue to be read and (re-)imagined in a fashion that reinforces my identity and its ongoing formation as normative.

I begin with this identification as a means of opening my thinking to the necessary critiques required; I cannot speak from the position of detached rationality and disincorporation that Western thinking thrives on. Such identification is by no means an abdication from the continued Western thinking reaching into my own writing, and I encourage critical readings of how who I am collides with my intellectual efforts. I want to start here as a segue into my second concern with historical thinking scholarship, that is, the absence of any regular consideration of how the thinker intrudes on the thinking. Speaking to the subject in historical thinking, Kent den Heyer (2011, p.157) rightly notes that the disciplinary methods of historical thinking are woefully inadequate with respect to their acknowledgment of the methodologist’s role in pedagogical development:

For reasons insufficiently explained, however, disciplinarians do not judge subjectivity or the social and political context of professional achievement to be important enough for students to take up as part of what historians do, or why they do what they do. It is as if the historical procedures identified as relevant for student study have been extracted in labs from historians who lack hopes, fantasies, or racialized, gendered, classed, and desiring bodies and who also lack political intelligence.
This is particularly acute in the articulation of disciplinary logics with the normalisation of whiteness. As Moreton-Robinson (2004) suggests for example, “Australian cultural representations of mateship, egalitarianism, individualism and citizenship are reproduced through disciplinary knowledges that are presented and taught as though they do not have an epistemological connection to whiteness” (p. 87). Such successful articulation of whiteness and disciplinary knowledge is, in large part possible, because of conventional practice in disciplines that insulates the racialised (along with the gendered, classed, and abled) subject from critical consideration. The racialised subject, here, can be and is evacuated from the critical space because it is of no deemed import, something we see with disciplinary thinking work.

Evidence for this claim is seen in the absence of identifications in historical thinking scholarship. Through the articulation of theory and empirical findings, theorists and methodologists conjure their own absence by avoiding consideration of their own cultural, historical and social locatedness as bearing down on their work. Aside from national identifications, considerations of racialised, gendered, classed and settler identifications are often excused from the critical work done. By evacuating the author, the impressions of identification are denied their place as an object of critique. To dispense with any acknowledgement of identity unduly positions the writer, theorists or pedagogue as ancillary or irrelevant. The damage done here is the reproduction of the quintessentially Western idea that knowledge can “just be” independent of the subject-position from which it emanates. An interesting example of this can be seen in explorations of how historical thinking can help understand cultural identity and how it mediates entry into the past. By asking participants to do this kind of work, there is an opportunity for the scholar to do the same. Yet, in varied studies of cultural and ethnic identity, this isn’t the case. In some work, identification and an account of the influence of the theorist is absent (Barton & Mccully, 2005; Levstik, 2001; Seixas, 1993) or, in some circumstances, it is acknowledged but in a rather cursory fashion (Peck, 2010, 2011). As Pinar (2009) reminds us, the absence of the “I” is an act of concealment, that is, it evades attention that needs to be paid to the, “subjectivity [that] gets smuggled back in as that detached omniscient observer” (p. 193). Inquiry into the role of individual or collective identity as it pertains to the past, then, is potentially deemed relevant for the learner reading the past but not for the detached methodologist engaging in the development of tools for those very students.

**Broadening engagements with the past**

Above, I argue that historical thinking scholarship theorises history education blind to the epistemic, cultural and subjective circumstances of its existence and its theorisers. Such a critique could rightly be countered with a request for an alternative which is a reasonable response. However, I’m reticent to do so for any alternative can only be of value within certain epistemic and ontological contexts; to offer an alternative that can supplant historical thinking (or even complement it in all cases) risks, falsely so, conveying the idea that the problem with historical thinking is solely its conceptual base when rather, it is (in part) the implied universality. However, in light of my second primary critique – the evacuation of the thinker – I do think there is space for different ways of seeing and working in relation to the past that principally acknowledges that students come with different ways of organising historical, social, and cultural knowledge.

As argued, neglecting consideration of the “who” of our pedagogical theorisations forgets that who we are in the making of the past is key. Indigenous students, for example, negotiate a “cultural interface” that reminds us of the problems with epistemic reduction for this is a space where “lived immersion reveals the presence of both [Western and Indigenous
knowledge systems] and the historical contingency of knowledge practice (Nakata, 2010, p. 56). Nakata (2002) further suggests that the interface “as a place of constant tension and negotiation of different interests and systems of Knowledge means that both must be reflected on and interrogated” (p. 286). This is particularly critical since, as Nakata (2007) suggests, much of our possible engagement with Indigenous knowledge is filtered and constructed through Western disciplinary practice; translation works to fit Indigenous ways of knowing into Western frames precluding such reflection. While more carefully positioning the author of pedagogical practice and theorisation, in no way, operates as a panacea or a guarantee of new spaces of reflection, surfacing the writer of practice opens this work for critique and makes evident the “translator” and the necessary interrogation not just of the past itself but the means of entering it. In settler-colonial contexts where history has for too long been written about Indigenous peoples from the falsely assumed vantage point of epistemic distance, calling attention to the contingency of practice and the role of teachers and scholars as the authors of methods opens the reflective and critical space to consider not just the what of the past but also the how.

Opening up conversations of the past in our classroom to be inclusive of the epistemological diversity of the past’s very construction allows for a pedagogical practice that is attentive to the multiple entry points into the past. This, most certainly, has to be locally specific; this is not to suggest that we focus exclusively on local history but rather that our engagements with the past need to be grounded in local conceptions that may not fit neatly into universalising knowledge traditions. In Australia, the inclusion of the ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Histories and Cultures’ cross-curriculum priority, a curricular priority infused throughout subject areas, offers itself as a potential vector for this kind of work in recognising that non-Western knowledge is critical in our pedagogical endeavours. While this is the case, the organisation of history through disciplinary logics as the intellectual frame for constructing the past routes any possibilities here through Western approaches to the past, effectively colonising entry into Indigenous ways of knowing. A resolution, then, requires either (a) a reimagining of curriculum to be relational from its foundation or; (b) concerted efforts by schools to teach the methods of historical thinking as a possible way of knowing, not the way of knowing, emphasising how historical thinking is a way of knowing created by certain people whose vision of the past undoubtedly frames what they can know. Or, in the language of historical thinking, the writers of its methods also have perspectives about the past and students need to be availed of these.

**Conclusion**

I offer my case here not as a combative proposition but rather a starting point to more meaningfully theorise the foundations of history education beyond the contemporary impulse to orbit our thinking around Western disciplined approaches. That disciplinary thinking quickly becomes the de-facto framework in history (or de jure in places such as Australia where it is now written into the national curriculum) is dangerous when this slippage does not recognise that other modes of existing in relation to the past can also be helpful.

It should be noted that historical thinking has a particular place and warrants one by virtue of its ability to focus inquiry into the past in ways that are robust and pedagogically operational. Historical thinking can be a way into the past but we can’t rightly allow it to monopolise the pedagogical space. This poses a challenge for pedagogical efforts, one that I can’t resolve other than to suggest that scholarly commitments to make historical thinking the quintessential and most robust means of entry into the past require a moment of suspension and internal critique of the command over the past that is (implicitly) demanded. At the very least, commitments need to be made to deny any one method exclusive control over historical
work, particularly when that method makes claims at (or lends itself to) universal applicability and ignores the role of the subject in thinking. When we do this, we allow for better, more ethical and culturally aware approaches to the past.

References


Endnotes

1 It might be argued that Seixas’s concern is more with the nature of the specific historical traditions themselves and less their non-Western form. However, the categorisation of non-Western forms as “antimodern” and the slippery slope argumentation offered against other traditions appears to reflect an epistemic concern about other non-Western historical approaches and less the approaches themselves.

About the Author

Bryan Smith is a lecturer in Education at James Cook University. His work looks at the anti-racist and decolonising readings of humanities and social sciences education. His current line of work looks at the making of settler place and how everyday features of the urban landscape writes settler possession into the material and symbolic spaces of communities. This work has brought him to look at the role of street naming in settler communities and the complex entanglements of geography and history in normalising white settler possession. The results of this work can be seen in the online tool Topomapper that presents a digital mapping of the namesakes behind the City of Townsville’s street names.