



Story education: Assessing history education in light of narrative therapy

Lucas-Frederik Garske
Freie Universität Berlin / Universität Göttingen, Germany

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the obstructive dimension of specific declarative knowledge on historical thinking. Through considering the anthropological and social-psychological functions of stories, the author identifies potential difficulties individuals may face when trying to decipher, understand, and evaluate particular stories, as intended by historical thinking. By comparing the incapacity to cope with complex historic narratives with the effects of trauma, the paper discusses how approaches in narrative psychotherapy may add interesting insights to the domain of history education. The paper concludes that selection of declarative knowledge needs to be critically reviewed from a pathological perspective if historical thinking is set to be one of the main functions of history education.

KEYWORDS

History education, Historical thinking, Narrative therapy, Michael White.

CITATION

Garske, L. F. (2021). Story education: Assessing history education in light of narrative therapy, *Historical Encounters*, 8(1), 70-82. <https://doi.org/10.52289/hej8.105>

COPYRIGHT

© Copyright retained by Author
Published 4 November 2021
Distributed under a [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) License

Teaching stories: *Conflicting ambitions*

In his pioneering work on historical thinking, Sam Wineburg described traditional history instruction as a form of information dissemination: “Students might master an agreed-upon narrative, but they lacked any way of evaluating it, of deciding whether it, or any other narrative, was compelling or true” (Wineburg, 2001, p. 41). By comparison, modern history instruction focuses on the form of knowledge where students are encouraged to think like a historian; that is, to learn a set of skills which allow them to reason and reflect upon stories of past events, the historiographical process, and its methodology (Wineburg, 2001; Levesque, 2009; Seixas & Morton 2013, Seixas 2017). There is a long-standing consensus between historians and educators that instruction in these skills should go hand in hand with the instruction of declarative knowledge about the past, the *res gestae*, and correspondent conceptualizations (Lee, 1983; Brophy & VanSledright, 1997; Counsell, 2000; Wineburg, 2001; Barton & Levstik, 2008; Carretero, et al., 2013; Hasberg, 2013). Studies have repeatedly shown, however, that despite efforts to teach historical thinking, students have difficulty understanding the constructivist notion of history (Martens, 2009; Schönemann, et. al., 2011). There is also some indication that the conveyance of declarative knowledge obstructs the formation of a constructivist perspective on history (Hammack 2011; Carretero, et al., 2012). This raises questions about the persistence of traditional instruction and calls for a deeper look into the functionality of stories about the past in order to identify the challenges that still exist with teaching and learning historical thinking.

In the first part of the paper, I elaborate on the objectifying power of (hi)stories and discuss how the inability to self-reliantly reflect on a given story of the past marks a pathological dimension of narratives. In the second part of the paper, I explore potential challenges to thinking critically about complex and unrelated stories and compare these challenges to similar problems in narrative psychotherapy. Finally, I explain how the theoretical approach of narrative therapy provides insights to assess the performance of history education on a programmatic level.

Enchanting: *A story about the power of narration*

Stories are ubiquitous and concern all forms of human communication, as Barthes (1975) has famously pointed out. It comes as no surprise, that there is a diverse academic interest in stories and their potential to shape social structures. Particularly in the context of prose, the relation to power often comes across as a feature rather than a problem. In these cases, the *power* (Forna 2017; Sanders 1997) or even “magic of stories” (Strong & North, 1996) serves as a means of empowerment. A graphical example is Emily Dickinson’s poem “There is no frigate like a book”, in which Dickinson describes stories as vehicles “[t]o take us lands away” (Dickinson, 1998, pp. 1116). Demanding appeals such as “go, get lost in a novel” (Gottschall, 2012, p. 199) rely on this romantic ideal of literature as a medium to extend the horizon of experience. Likewise, using the metaphor of traveling, social psychology describes losing oneself in symbolic contexts as transportation, where the *traveller*

(...) goes some distance from his or her world of origin which makes some aspects of the world of origin inaccessible and returns to the world of origin, somewhat changed by the journey. (Gerrig, 1993, pp. 10–11)

Stories are significant tools that shape realities. Phenomena such as the hype of long-awaited sequels or *binge-watching*, graphically demonstrate the power which dwells within, or becomes expressed by, stories. These metaphors of physical force bluntly express how fiction and fact interrelate: stories can enchant us, captivate us, and eventually, as Dickinson writes, carry us away. They do not just represent a different world into which we dive, but also sites where we – intentionally or unintentionally – lose control.

A mystery tour without control of the vehicle as in Dickinson’s poem may encourage both escapist joy and existential fear. Thus, let us take a close look at the specific circumstances under which transportation takes place, to assess the ramifications of getting lost in a story.

Humans feel emotions when reading, listening, or watching a story, even if they do not consider the presentation to be factual (Gerrig, 1993). This emotional reaction demonstrates the close connection between fiction and physical experience. Different studies attest that the process of transportation comes with a loss of time-awareness as well as a loss of awareness of the surrounding world in general (Green & Brock, 2000; Jennet, et al., 2008). The more we devote ourselves to a specific story, the more we lose the awareness of its aesthetic form – and vice versa. (Gerrig, 1993; Appell & Richter, 2007)

Given that traditional philosophy of consciousness dropped the subject-object-relation over the course of the linguistic turn (Bachmann-Medick, 2006), we can apply these findings to histories – stories which are considered to represent the past. Humanists commonly accept the idea of a socially constructed reality that is independent of our own volition, an acceptance addressed in the publication of Berger and Luckmann (1967). From this perspective, human reality only exists as a symbolic form, as an apparent or virtual reality (Nusselder, 2014).

Still, we do not need to reject the distinction between reality and virtuality entirely. Instead, we can analytically distinguish the way subjects relate to narratives of considered facts: The more a subject is capable and willing to reflect upon the aesthetic form of the narrative, the less (s)he is prone to get lost in it. Once a subject is unable or unwilling to consider the aesthetic form, (s)he follows the narrative without taking note of the form. Mieke Bal explains this effect by the example of Scheherazade, who entraps the Persian king in an endless fairy tale to prevent him from killing her. Tangled up in Scheherazade's stories, the emperor forgets his original intentions and eventually discards the idea to kill her entirely (Bal, 2009). Interestingly, the same loss of context pertains to us – likewise listeners of Scheherazade – who tend to remember the story of Aladdin, Sindbad or Ali Baba but rarely the plot of the actual story – the fairy tale of One Thousand and One Nights, a story about the power of narration.

We can assume that the enchanting power of narration relies not only on the will of the reader/listener, but also on the complexity of the aesthetic form (Neitzel & Nohr, 2006). The potential of stories to influence behaviour calls for a deeper look at the pragmatism of storytelling. A side glance to anthropology indicates that the human interest in stories may be a result of a compensatory function. As neuropsychologists argue, humans experience a fundamental struggle for orientation and use stories to provide coherence in hindsight (Grawe, 2004). In this sense, Hans Blumenberg asserts that humans narrate stories as a matter of diversion – to amuse ("*Zeitvertreib*") or to divert from existential fear ("*Vertreibung von Furcht*") (Blumenberg, 2011, pp. 40–41).

We can often observe this kind of escapism in the way small children interact with narrations: on the one hand they have an ability to hear and read stories over and over again and to identify even small deviations; on the other hand they are often unable to deal with open story ends and have the impetus to complete them, sometimes with highly creative plots. We can think of this *luxuriant imagination* as a tool to deal with the absence of sense (Nusselder, 2014), a means of defence in a struggle of self-affirmation or, as Sendak puts it, a "struggle to make themselves King of All Wild Things" (Cott, 1976). This anthropological effect has been described by sociologist Erich Fromm in the context of educational theory: During the process of individuation the subject is faced with the scary responsibility to orientate and find confidence (Fromm, 1941). As Fromm writes, the perceived inability to create coherence on its own leads the subject to an escape towards conformity and authority – (s)he becomes the object of the story.

This idea reveals both the political dimension of narratives (Gadinger, et al., 2014) and the parallels to psychotraumatic effects where individuals turn "into symptoms of a story, which they are unable to retain" (Caruth, 2000, p. 86). Harald Weilnböck, who explored the narratological dimension of trauma, stressed that the forced confrontation with the incomprehensible and ungraspable – that which cannot be couched in understandable terms – leads to a substantial discontinuity of a previously coherent narrative identity and turns into a trauma that is the "presence of an uncompleted narrative process gone astray" (Weilnböck, 2005, p. 2). Healing the trauma is therefore technically a literacy skill that allows the subject to turn from object to author

of his/her story – a striking link to historical thinking (Seixas, et. al., 2000), which is also considered a literacy skill to construct meaningful accounts of the past.

Traumatizing: *The pathological dimension of histories in educational contexts*

Of course, we must not equate any incapacity to create senseful historic narratives with specific forms of traumatization. Still, we can use the political or even pathological perspective to critically review narration. As Frank Ankersmit writes, “there is an indissoluble link between history and the miseries and the horrors of the past” because history results from a “kind of traumatic collective experience” (Ankersmit, 2002, p. 76). From Ankersmit’s view, historical narrations show past reality as a steady development traversed by grief and relief, of action and reaction. The narration of traumatic events in social contexts are specific to the traumatic event, yet the retelling itself can lead to secondary traumatization.

At least in the German context, the concept of *trauma* was widely adopted in the humanities, particularly around the millennium in several publications (Bronfen, et al., 1999; Rüsen, & Straub, 1998; Baer, 2000). Authors such as Aleida Assmann (1999), Manfred Weinberg (1999) and Michael Roth (1998) appraised the preservative function of traumas as a vital or stabilizing (Assmann, 1999) function and show a genuine interest to prove the “incurability” (Weinberg, 1999).

From this stance, authors such as Roth (1998, p. 173) assess the narrative reproduction of traumatic events as a potential “to write against oblivion”, even though the desired effect clearly represents a form of secondary traumatization. Contrary to psychoanalytical approaches, which are more interested in reconciling, Roth’s perspective asserts that the imminent threat does not emanate from the trauma itself, but from the narration which ultimately leads to recovery and integration into everyday discourse (Roth, 1998, p. 172). In this light commemorative storytelling appears as some sort of *trauma management* that does not intend to question the particular meaning given by the narrative, but to conserve the trauma. This highlights the ambivalent function of stories as vehicles of submission as well as tools to structure and organize meaning. Moreover, it questions the reasoning when bringing up certain stories in educational contexts.

In history education the need for orientation has occasionally been considered an argument for the primacy of content conveyance over the conveyance of skills (Garske, 2017a). Among many scholars there is a declared, yet rarely proven consensus that students have a kind of innate interest in history (Borries, 2001). Some historians such as Buck have gone so far as to claim that students are “no young historians and certainly no researchers”, who first and foremost look for orientation in the present (Buck, 2005, p. 7), prioritize knowing who they are and where they come from. From this point of view, historical thinking is possible only after students possess a *solid* basic knowledge of certain stories.

Empirical studies such as the work of Matthias Martens (2009) appear to support the thesis that the vast majority of students are over-challenged with the scientific notion of *history* as a construct. Instead of conceiving this problem as a lack of basic knowledge, however, we should focus on the lack of methodological practice in history education. Much in this sense, Martens calls for “an explicit conveyance of basic epistemological correlations” and a “more intensive and critical engagement with representations and interpretations of history” (Martens, 2009, pp. 338-339). Similarly, Wineburg has shown that students repeatedly failed to distinguish source documents from secondary information, which he interprets as a lack of education on the production of stories (cf. Leinhardt & Ravi, 2008).

Yet, the problem could be even more deeply rooted in the act of selecting the material itself, the introduction of previously unrelated stories in the classroom provides coherence and orientation in relation to a specific discourse of society. It also restricts the questions that students can, should, and have to be asked, as well as the scope of answers. Borries (2001) has pointed out that the assumption of a genuine interest in history among secondary students strikingly lacks an

empirical basis – at least with regard to unrelated subject matter. Quite the contrary, he states that interest in content that is “imposed” upon students is an illusion, and as such is counter-productive for historical learning.

The lacking ability to relate to declarative knowledge, as predefined by history curricula, limits the scope of proficient interaction: educational media such as textbooks as well as instructors, often provide students with abbreviated or even summarized historiographic narratives, thereby supposedly compensating for the lack of relation between specialist knowledge and learning subjects. These *assisting narratives* to complex narrations of the past (Garske, 2015) put things into place: *source material* is processed in a way that students are *able to understand*. Layout and illustration in textbooks suggest a certain reading and an authored (hi)storyline eliminates metadiscourse (Wineburg, 2001). Critical discussions on source material are introduced, for example, by juxtaposing contradicting historical statements or highlighting relevant aspects.

In summary, it seems likely that specialist narratives which students are unable to understand either cause them to reject the information or to cultivate subjection to the story. Both outcomes obstruct the process of learning how to think historically. It also suggests that rather than increasing the ability to think historically, assisting narratives to complex narrations of the past potentially facilitate escapist behaviour and the cluster of symptoms which keep people from coming to terms with traumatic events. Given this connection, I will next examine approaches in narrative therapy and discuss how they may give us ways to reckon with the enchanting dimension of stories.

Breaking the spell: *Re-authoring history*

Academic discussions of the relationship between therapy and education can be traced back to the 1980s and have repeatedly led to disputes about the conceptual distinction and parallels (Ludewig, 1987; Böhm, 1997). Proponents of linking educational and therapeutical research predominantly originated in modern counselling approaches, such as art and narrative therapy (Hörmann, 1988; Schön, 1989; Hyland, 2011). In the following section I will stress the similar intentions of education and therapy to empower individuals to deal with uncertainty and contingency. In this context, the crucial challenge of teaching how to think historically appears to lie in the (in)ability of students to deal with narratives they are unfamiliar with. Given the tradition to predefine a set of stories in school curricula, history educators cannot easily focus on skill-based learning and thereby freely select stories that fit the students’ needs.

As Fromm asserts, it is not the task of education to overcome the fear [of contingency], but to teach how to *come to terms* with it by strengthening the ability of the individual to face his/her fears and to prepare for the existential challenge (cf. Berg-Wenzel, 1987). In the 1980s several works in the field of history education applied psychoanalysis and the relevance of emotional conditions to history education (cf. Schulz-Hageleit 1982; Knigge 1988). The discussion of counselling approaches in this context is, however, fairly uncommon. Given the diversity of therapeutic approaches, I relate therapy and education as general heuristic and focus on narrative approaches in systemic therapy.

Narrative therapy, a postmodern counselling method, influenced by the work of Ervin Goffman and Clifford Geertz and strongly related to the work of Michael White and David Epston (White & Epston, 1989; White, 1995; 2007; Tarragona 2008), focuses on the relationship between narrative practice and the opening up of *identity conclusions*. White assumes that identity conclusions developed in the course of trauma are compromised by the status of truth assigned to them due to the subject’s inability to challenge the narrative (White, 2001) These stories, which White – following Geertz – refers to as *thin conclusions*, “contribute to a strong sense of one’s life being held in suspense” (White, 2001, p. 3). White and Epston (1989) believe that the *suspension* of the affected individuals traces back to their inability to make sense of traumatic events on their own, which is why they fall into *thin conclusions*, causing them to accept their own trauma narrative as

genuine and immutable and – as described above – eventually become the symptom or object of the narrative.

Since the contradictions and restrictions of these *thin conclusions* are subconscious and not directly accessible to the affected person, White (2001) proposes a narrative externalisation of the conclusions. This way clients may deal with them as symbolic – thus observable – artefacts and identify subtle cracks and fault lines, instead of treating them as incontestable. This process ideally initiates a transition from the passive *listening* to thin conclusions to the authoring of thick descriptions. White refers to this process as “re-authoring” (White, 2001, p. 5).

White (2001) points out that it is a common misunderstanding to conceive of thick descriptions as more correct, authentic, or intrinsic accounts. Quite the contrary, he stresses that the reification of narratives entails substantial risks for the counselling process. *First* and foremost, naturalistic representations lead to the reproduction of a holistic perspective on the world. *Second*, this kind of essentialist thinking contributes to the objectification of narratives, causing pathological effects. *Third*, and related to that, essentialist thinking marginalises otherness and reduces curiosity for alternative perspectives (White, 2001).

Although it may seem reasonable to provide people who are unable to create coherence with a professionally adjusted thick description, White (2001) cautions that this will not increase the independence of the client but rather contribute to a life lived thinly. Meanwhile, re-authoring does not lead to a random narrative: it aims at uncovering selectiveness and construction of (common) sense. By doing so, new possibilities arise to redefine and dispute meaning in conversation with others. The therapy does not intend to cast out the *irrational* or contradictory elements that may arise, but to empower clients to self-reliantly make sense of them and by so doing, thwart their dominating presence (White, 2001).

Here, we need to consider a crucial difference between therapy and education: the former concerns the narrative identity of the client, whereas in educational contexts we deal with an identity constructed meta-historically by the curriculum. Nonetheless, the comparison indicates that when students confront stories which they are unable to make sense of, their capacity to *do history* independently declines. It also provides us with some clues about how the educational setting could be improved. White’s counselling approach is particularly fruitful when creating a productive relationship between declarative and strategic knowledge (Garske, 2017a) and the role of the instructor:

First, White asserts the legitimacy of declarative knowledge in the counselling process. Narrative therapy is not interested in deconstructing or negating facts. However, the method also does not seek to correct *wrong* accounts. Instead, it starts with the externalized conceptual knowledge of the client. By working with the knowledge of the client, the method aims at empowering him/her to re-author narratives which have been accepted only because of a lack of alternatives. *Second*, during the therapeutic process the client is encouraged to develop narratives, in which (s)he may come to terms with events of the past, but also to build a recognition of the mutability of narratives (White, 1990). This way, the therapy prevents the client working with merely *better* knowledge in the end (White, 1990). *Third*, critical and meaningful events are not introduced by, but developed in dialogue with the counsellor, whose activity is strictly guided by the interest in the client developing an independent stance. *Finally and ideally*, the therapy does not only teach clients a strategy to re-author stories about a specific critical event, but also conveys general skills how to approach and avoid thin conclusions. At the end of a successful therapy the individual will have internalised the methodological approach and is able to apply it to other occasions.

In narrative therapy, declarative knowledge remains important, however – unlike history education that is based on a curriculum of pre-selected historical narratives – not as a representation of truth, but as a narrative artifact. Students may have an innate interest in history based on their own incapacity of developing a narrative of who they are. The pre-selection of narratives, however, does not address this interest. It is rather a by-product of society’s interest in enabling students to participate in (a particular) society. While in the corpus of pre-selected

narratives there is, of course, plenty of material that might be used to empower students to think historically, the primal principle of selection is rather a measure of obstruction. So, why don't we just discard pre-selected narratives from the curriculum and give educators the necessary leeway to teach students how to think historically with whatever historical account that fits the need?

It is a quite common defence to insist on the need for declarative knowledge whenever there is a call to foster strategic skills to deal with narrations of the past (Garske, 2017a). There is no question that from an abstract perspective, historical learning is impossible without historical accounts. As I have noted elsewhere, we must not confuse the necessity of historical accounts in class with the master narratives that are commonly demanded by school curricula (Garske, 2017b, pp. 127–129). In fact, these narratives are in many cases overly complex and usually only accessible courtesy of context narratives, as I have argued above. Other narratives are more prolific when it comes to the above-mentioned learning objectives: Students do not join classrooms as *blank slates*, they already know and reproduce historical narrations, regardless of whether we consider these narrations to be *correct* or *plausible*. They ask questions about their lives and why events developed in a specific manner. These narratives provide links to subsequent stories of personal interest – rich material to practice historical thinking (Mandell & Malone, 2008).

A direct relation to personal experience and interest allows students to engage with the material independently instead of being reliant on context or master narratives. They can re-author stories as experts. Instead of merely simulating the process of making sense of the past (see, for example, Garske 2017b, p. 128), they can create expert narratives themselves and work through the challenges of creating a commonly accepted story of reality. As students create stories, question sources and wrestle with what to omit or feature in a story (Garske & Müller, 2014), they produce what White (2001) refers to as externalization: an artifact that allows for a better understanding of how we construct meaning and – by doing so – not only improve their skills in writing history but also in assessing the historical constructions of others.

A counsellor, a teacher, or more generally, the educational medium, ceases to manage specialist knowledge when students produce their own stories. The teacher becomes a moderator or coach who provides students with the necessary space and tools to work on stories. They are also an observer who anticipates the sensitivities of students when dealing with meaningful stories. For instance, educational media may use individual externalizations of collective experiences such as school trips or dramatic events to demonstrate, discuss, and analyse processes of inclusion and exclusion, as well as of judgement and attribution. As Holt and Wolf (1995) put it, students' misconceptions of history must be explored, not ignored – not just in academia, but – more importantly – in the classroom. We need students to become journalists and historiographers first and foremost, to enable them to fill in the gaps in the curriculum and the narratives that societies constantly develop of themselves.

Re-authoring does not have to rely only on personal experience. The limitations that come with the acquisition of knowledge can also be addressed by any historical account that is meaningful to students (Garske 2017a). Beginning with students' questions and the urge to *explain* present conditions, narratives that exist in society may give more than plain answers but also generate more questions about the meaning and relevance of certain stories. This approach to history education is challenging, because while the demand for knowledge acquisition is rather low, both educators and students, must reflect upon stories that affect them in a personal way. Particularly for educators this involves the need to handle sensitivities that may emerge in the process of researching and writing self-authored stories.

Résumé. *Re-authoring as Didactic Strategy in History Education*

In this paper, I highlighted the objectifying power of stories and how the inability to approach stories effectively can be problematic, particularly when it comes to educational contexts. I argued that it becomes increasingly difficult for readers and/or listeners to reflect competently upon a

story the less able they are to conceive its aesthetic form. This can easily be the case with historical narratives, which often come across as the distillate of the past, formed by expert knowledge.

I compared these circumstances to trauma narratives, where the affected person turns into the symptom/object of the story. Being prompted yet unable to evaluate and construct narratives of past events, individuals become dependent on assisting narratives and – by doing so – cultivate the idea of their own incapacity to make sense on their own. As with history, the reliance on a certain narrative in a trauma situation causes the experience of the narrative to be genuine or objective. The paper argued that this problem poses a threat to the educational mandate since it leads to authoritative narratives rather than critical thinking.

The success of a therapy highly depends on the gravity/complexity of the trauma narrative. It is not at all uncommon that therapies fail, independent of the commitment of both counsellor and client. Likewise, I have suggested that the failure of many students in learning how to think historically is the fault of neither the student nor the teacher, but originates to a large part in the narratives they have to deal with. In this sense, the use of highly abstracted expert narratives as the basis for learning historical thinking seems unreasonable. In the past decades several models to evaluate the acquisition of competences in history education have been proposed (see, for example, Barricelli, Gautschi, & Körber, 2012, in the German context). We should not only use these models to evaluate the performance of students in class, but also to question the particular use of declarative knowledge.

In this paper, I discussed the systemic implications of using declarative knowledge that students cannot necessarily grasp. While many scholars and educators discuss the viability of competence-oriented approaches in opposition to approaches that focus on declarative or substantial historical knowledge, the approach chosen in this article suggests that there is no substantial conflict between both forms of knowledge: the actual conflict rests in the quality of the declarative knowledge and its particular suitability for students, a quality measured by the ability to exercise the required competence.

Of course, the need to focus on students when developing teaching concepts is not at all a new finding, but rather a pedagogical consensus that has roots in the educational reforms of the 20th century. *Schülerorientierung* [student-oriented pedagogy], understood as an approach that considers the interests, needs and suppositions of students (i.e. Dehne 2006, p. 159), is a broadly accepted theoretical principle – but how does this principle fit with the preselection of historical narratives?

The occasional failure of competence-oriented approaches is not a matter of their sophisticated nature, the lack of substantial knowledge or the mental capacity of students. We could argue that *Schülerorientierung* tends to fail whenever it cannot be applied effectively. Educators would need to give up on the prescribed narratives and select declarative knowledge based exclusively on students' interests, needs and beliefs.

Theory aside, can we expect a turn toward student-oriented skills instruction to become a reality? Is this not just scientific discourse far removed from practical requirements? Public response to approaches that critically review or attempt to change content-dominated curricula suggest that there are strong proponents for a subject that focuses on tradition and values (compare Garske, 2017b; Demantowsky, 2016). The subjection to a certain narrative also has a political dimension as it fosters the weaving of strong social fabric. This has been and can be the purpose of education - we cannot measure the purpose scientifically, for it is a political decision. However, we can assert, based on the reasoning of this paper, that the idea of reconciling the teaching of historical thinking with the preselection of historical material is problematic at best and compromising at worst.

If we assume a fundamental conflict between the approaches – teaching historical thinking and selecting narratives as required by society – educational reforms that try to reconcile these two approaches will fail at a certain level. Instead, we need to consider these as two different subjects: history education and story education. A subject that selects declarative knowledge because of its value and relevance to society on the one hand, and on the other hand a subject that selects

declarative knowledge because of its potential to develop narrative and analytical abilities as well as critical media literacy.

It may not (yet) be the time for a radical change in hi/story education, but it is well the time to sound out in what way the method of selecting historical narratives contributes to the failure or success of competences that we intend students to develop.

References

- Ankersmit, F. R. (2002). Trauma and suffering.: A forgotten source of Western historical consciousness. In J. Rüsen (Ed.), *Western historical thinking: An intercultural debate* (pp. 72–84). New York: Berghahn Books.
- Appel, M., Richter, T. (2007). Persuasive effects of fictional narratives increase over time. *Media Psychology* 10 (1), 113–134.
- Assmann, A. (1999). Teil I. In A. Assmann & U. Frevert (Eds.), *Geschichtsvergessenheit - Geschichtsversessenheit: Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945* (pp. 19–150). Stuttgart: DVA.
- Bachmann-Medick, D. (2006). Cultural turns: Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften. In D. Bachmann-Medick (Ed.), *Cultural turns: Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften* (pp. 7–57). Reinbek: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Bal, M. (1997). *Narratology: Introduction to the theory of narrative* (2nd ed). Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.
- Barricelli, M., Gautschi, P., & Körber, A. (2012). Historische Kompetenzen und Kompetenzmodelle. In M. Barricelli & M. Lücke (Eds.), *Wochenschau Geschichte. Handbuch praxis des Geschichtsunterrichts* (pp. 207–235). Schwalbach/Ts.: Wochenschau-Verl.
- Barton, K. C., & Levstik, L. S. (2004). *Teaching history for the common good*. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1967). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. London: Allen Lane.
- Blumenberg, H. (2011). *Arbeit am Mythos. Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft: Vol. 1805*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Böhm, W. (1997). Über die Unvereinbarkeit von Erziehung und Therapie. In W. Böhm & A. Lischewski (Eds.), *Entwürfe zu einer Pädagogik der Person: Gesammelte Aufsätze* (pp. 169–189). Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt.
- Borries, B. von (2001). Geschichtsdidaktik am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts.: Eine Bestandaufnahme zum Spannungsfeld zwischen Geschichtsunterricht und Geschichtspolitik. In H.-J. Pandel & G. Schneider (Eds.), *Wie weiter?: Zur Zukunft des Geschichtsunterrichts* (pp. 7–32). Schwalbach/Ts.: Wochenschau-Verl.
- Borries, B. von (2007). "Geschichtsbewusstsein" und "Historische Kompetenz" von Studierenden der Lehrämter "Geschichte". *Zeitschrift Für Geschichtsdidaktik*, 60–83.
- Brophy, J., & VanSledright, B. (1997). *Teaching and learning history in elementary schools*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Buck, T. M. (2005). Bildungsplanreform und Geschichtsunterricht in Baden-Württemberg. *Lehren Und Lernen. Zeitschrift Für Schule Und Innovation in Baden-Württemberg*, 31, 23–32.

- Carretero, M. (2013). Conceptual change and historical narratives about the nation: A theoretical and empirical approach. In S. Vosniadou (Ed.), *International handbook of research on conceptual change* (2nd ed., pp. 269–286). New York: Routledge.
- Carretero, M., Asensio, M., & Rodríguez Moneo, M. (Eds.) (2012). *International review of history education. History education and the construction of national identities*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203154472-22>
- Caruth, C. (2011). Trauma als historische Erfahrung: Die Vergangenheit einholen. In U. Baer (Ed.), *Edition Suhrkamp Standpunkte: Vol. 2141. "Niemand zeugt für den Zeugen": Erinnerungskultur und historische Verantwortung nach der Shoah* (3rd ed., pp. 84–98). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Counsell, C. (2000). Historical knowledge and historical skills: The distracting dichotomy. In J. Arthur & R. Phillips (Eds.), *Issues in subject teaching series. Issues in history teaching* (pp. 54–71). London & New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203024041-12>
- Dehne, B. (2006): Schülerorientierung. In Mayer, U. et al. (Eds.) (2006): *Wörterbuch Geschichtsdidaktik* (159–160). Schwalbach/Ts.: Wochenschau.
- Demantowsky, M. (2016). Jenseits des Kompetenzdiskurs. In S. Handro & B. Schönemann (Eds.) *Aus der Geschichte lernen? Weiße Flecken der Kompetenzdebatte*. Berlin: LIT.
- Dickinson, E., & Franklin, R. W. (1998). *The Poems of Emily Dickinson* (Bd. 1): Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Erich Fromm (1941): *Die Furcht vor der Freiheit*. München.
- Gadinger, F., Jarzebski, F., & Yildiz, S. (2014). Politische narrative: Konturen einer politikwissenschaftlichen Erzähltheorie. In F. Gadinger, F. Jarzebski, & S. Yildiz (Eds.), *Politische Narrative: Konzepte - Analysen - Forschungspraxis* (pp. 3–38). Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-02581-6_1
- Garske, L. F., & Müller, L. (2014). *Die Geschichte sichtbar machen. Kontrastive Schulbuchanalyse und die Grenzen der Narration*. In F. F. K. Berner (Ed.), *Sichtbares und Unsichtbares* (pp. 135–156). Frankfurt am Main.
- Garske, L. F. (2015). Geschichtsbilder sehen: Narrative Formen als Gegenstand des Lernens mit Geschichten. *Bildungsforschung*, 12(1), 12–33. Retrieved from https://www.pedocs.de/volltexte/2016/12391/pdf/BF_2015_1_Garske_Geschichtsbilder_sehen.pdf
- Garske, L.-F. (2017a). *Challenging substantive knowledge in educational media*. *Journal of Educational Media, Memory, and Society*, 9(2), 110–128. <https://doi.org/10.3167/jemms.2017.090206>
- Garske, L.-F. (2017b). *Zwischen Historischem Denken und Basiswissen.: Der Streit um das Berlin-Brandenburgische Kerncurriculum als Debatte um das Grundverständnis des Geschichtsunterrichts*. *Zeitschrift Für Didaktik Der Gesellschaftswissenschaften*, 8(1), 119–131.
- Gerrig, R. J. (1993). *Experiencing narrative worlds: On the psychological activities of reading*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gottschall, J. (2012). *The storytelling animal: How stories make us human*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

- Grawe, K. (2004). *Neuropsychotherapie*. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
- Green, M. C., & Brock, T. C. (2000). The role of transportation in the persuasiveness of public narratives. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79(5), 701–721.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.5.701>
- Hammack, P. L. (2011). *Narrative and the politics of identity: The cultural psychology of Israeli and Palestinian youth*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hasberg, W. (2013). Jutta oder Johanna - oder wer macht hier Geschichte(n)? Grundlegende Bemerkungen zur Narrativität historischen Lernens. *Zeitschrift Für Didaktik Der Gesellschaftswissenschaften*, 4(2), 55–82.
- Holt, T. C., & Wolf, D. (1995). *Thinking historically: Narrative, imagination, and understanding. The Thinking series*. New York: College Entrance Examination Board.
- Hörmann, G. (1988). Erziehung, Bildung, Therapie. *Musik-, Tanz- Und Kunsttherapie*, 1, 87–92.
- Hyland, T. (2011). Education and therapy. In T. Hyland (Ed.), *Lifelong learning book series: Vol. 17. Mindfulness and learning: Celebrating the affective dimension of education* (pp. 11–23). Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1911-8_2
- Jennett, C., Cox, A. L., Cairns, P., Dhoparee, S., Epps, A., Tijs, T., & Walton, A. (2008). Measuring and defining the experience of immersion in games. *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies*, 66(9), 641–661. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2008.04.004>
- Knigge, V. (1988). "Triviales" Geschichtsbewußtsein und verstehender Geschichtsunterricht. *Geschichtsdidaktik Studien, Materialien: N.F., 3*. Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verl.-Ges.
- Lee, P. (2009). History teaching and philosophy of history. *History and Theory*, 22(4), 21–31.
- Leinhardt, G., & Ravi, A. K. (2013). Changing historical conceptions of history. In S. Vosniadou (Ed.), *International handbook of research on conceptual change* (2nd ed., pp. 328–343). New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203154472-21>
- Lévesque, S. (2009). *Thinking historically: Educating students for the twenty-first century* (Reprinted in paperback). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Ludewig, K. (1989). Therapie oder Erziehung - Widerspruch oder Ergänzung? In W. Rotthaus & H. von Foerster (Eds.), *Therapie in der Kinder- und Jugendpsychiatrie: Vol. 5. Erziehung und Therapie in systemischer Sicht* (2nd ed., pp. 90–100). Dortmund: Verl. Modernes Lernen.
- Martens, M. (2009). Reconstructing historical understanding.: How students deal with historical accounts. In M. Martens, U. Hartmann, M. Sauer, & M. Hasselhorn (Eds.), *Interpersonal understanding in historical context* (pp. 115–136). Rotterdam: Sense.
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789460910685_008
- Mandell, N., & Malone, B. (2007). *Thinking like a historian: Rethinking history instruction: a framework to enhance and improve teaching and learning*. Wisconsin Historical Society Press.
- Neitzel, B., & Nohr, R. F. (2006). *Das Spiel mit dem Medium: Partizipation - Immersion - Interaktion ; [zur Teilhabe an den Medien von Kunst bis Computerspiel. Schriftenreihe der Gesellschaft für Medienwissenschaft: Vol. 14*. Marburg: Schüren.
- Nusselder, A. (2014). Being more than yourself. Virtuality and human spirit. In M. Grimshaw (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of virtuality* (pp. 71–85). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199826162.013.042>

- Rabanus, C. (2010). Virtual Reality. In H. R. Sepp & L. Embree (Eds.), *Handbook of phenomenological aesthetics: Contributions to phenomenology* (Vol. 59, pp. 343–350). Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2471-8_68
- Ricœur, P. (1991). Narrative identity. *Philosophy Today*, 35(1), 73–81.
- Roth, M. (2001). Trauma, repräsentation und historisches Bewusstsein. In J. Rüsen & J. Straub (Eds.), *Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft: Vol. 1403. Die dunkle Spur der Vergangenheit: Psychoanalytische Zugänge zum Geschichtsbewußtsein* (1st ed., pp. 153–173). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Rüsen, J. (2001). *Zerbrechende Zeit: Über den Sinn der Geschichte*. Köln: Böhlau.
- Ryan, M.-L. (2001). *Narrative as virtual reality: Immersion and interactivity in literature and electronic media*. Parallax. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Schenk, T. (2007). Der Zug ist abgefahren...: Konzeption und Zwischenergebnisse einer Untersuchung zu geschichtlichen Interessen und historischen Vorstellungen von Schülern im Primar- und Sekundarstufenbereich. *Zeitschrift Für Geschichtsdidaktik*, 6, 166–196.
- Schön, B. (1989). *Therapie statt Erziehung?: Chancen und Probleme der Therapeutisierung pädagogischer und sozialer Arbeit*. Frankfurt/Main: VAS.
- Schönemann, B., Thünemann, H., & Zülsdorf-Kersting, M. (2011). *Was können Abiturienten?: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Debatte über Kompetenzen und Standards im Fach Geschichte* (2. Aufl.). *Geschichtskultur und historisches Lernen: Bd. 4*. Berlin: Lit.
- Schulz-Hageleit, P. (1982). *Geschichte. Erfahren, gespielt, begriffen*. Braunschweig: Westermann.
- Seixas, P. (2017). A model of historical thinking. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 49(6), 593–605. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2015.1101363>
- Seixas, P. & Morton T. (2013). *The big six: Historical thinking concepts*. Toronto: Nelson Education.
- Seixas, P., Stearns, P. N., & Wineburg, S. (Eds.) (2000). *Knowing, teaching, and learning history: National and international perspectives*. New York: New York Univ. Press.
- Strong, C. J., & North, K. H. (1996). *The magic of stories: Literature-based language intervention*. Eau Claire, Wis.: Thinking Publications.
- Tarragona, M. (2008). Postmodern/poststructuralist Therapy. In J. Lebow (Ed.), *Twenty-first century psychotherapies: Contemporary approaches to theory and practice* (pp. 167–205). Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
- Van Norden, J. (2013). Geschichte ist Narration. *Zeitschrift Für Didaktik Der Gesellschaftswissenschaften*. (2), 20–35.
- Weilnböck, H. (2005). Psychotrauma, narration in the media, and the literary public – and the difficulties of becoming interdisciplinary. In Meister (Ed.) *Narratology beyond literary criticism* (pp. 239–264). <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110201840.239>
- Weinberg, M. (1999). Trauma – Geschichte, Gespenst, Literatur – und Gedächtnis. In E. Bronfen, S. Weigel, & B. Erdle (Eds.), *Literatur - Kultur - Geschlecht Kleine Reihe: Vol. 14. Trauma: Zwischen Psychoanalyse und kulturellem Deutungsmuster* (pp. 171–206). Köln: Böhlau.

- Wineburg, S. S. (1991). Historical problem solving: A study of the cognitive processes used in the evaluation of documentary and pictorial evidence. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 83, 73–87. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0663.83.1.73>
- Wineburg, S. S. (2001). *Historical thinking and other unnatural acts: Charting the future of teaching the past. Critical perspectives on the past*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- White, M., & Epston, D. (1989). *Literate means to therapeutic ends*. Adelaide: Dulwich Centre Publications.
- White, M. (1995). *Re-authoring lives: Interviews and essays*. Adelaide: Dulwich Centre Publications.
- White, Michael (2001): Narrative practice and the unpacking of identity conclusions. In: *Gecko: A Journal of Deconstruction and Narrative Ideas in Therapeutic Practice* (1), S. 28–55.
- White, M. (2007). *Maps of narrative practice* (1. ed.). A Norton professional book. New York, NY: Norton.
- Zipes, J. (2012). *The irresistible fairy tale: The cultural and social history of a genre*. Princeton. <https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691153384.001.0001>